Sunday 16 August 2009

Parshas Shoftim

“Judges and guards give for yourself in all your gates which Hashem your God gives to you to your tribes and judge the people a righteous judgment.” Devorim 16:18
Rashi explains that this verse requires the establishment of botei din, (courts), to judge and a system of enforcement to impose their ruling as required.

Upon whom is this requirement placed? Who has the responsibility of appointing the courts?

The Sefer HaChinuch writes, “And this is one of the mitzvos upon the community as a whole in every place.”

In Ayeles HaShachar on Makos 7a also asks this question and concludes, “It requires consideration as to whether this obligation falls upon the people of the place in question or on the Sanherdrin HaGodol, (the great court of seventy one). It is logical that this obligation is on the people of the place.”

In Parshas Yisro, Yisro advises Moshe to establish a system of courts, “Any big thing should be brought before you, (Moshe) and any small issue should be judged by them, (the men who would be appointed to judge).

The verse tells us, “And Moshe harkened to the words of his father in law and did all that he had said. And Moshe chose capable men from all Yisroel and he gave them as heads over the people, etc.” Shemos 18:25

With Moshe now exhorting Yisroel to establish botei din, it would appear reasonable to follow his example and establish local botei din via the highest judicial authority – i.e. the Sanhedrin HaGodol. How does the Ayeles HaShachar consider the opposite to be logical?!

A possible answer could be that since each individual is obligated to conduct his affairs in accordance with halocho, they are required to consult a beis din in an unclear or disputed case in order to resolve any disagreement and ensure that monies and property reside with their legitimate owner. A local beis din will be required! Thus, the people of any given place as a corporate body of individuals are obligated to establish a beis din.

The Netziv, in HoEmek Dovor, writes that Sanhedin HaGdol is referred to in the singular and understands the singular, “loch”, “for yourself” as meaning that this is an obligation on the Sanhedrin HaGodol, that they should establish a beis din in each town and supervise them to ensure that they judge a righteous judgment.

Even though in Makos, Ayeles HaShacha considers it logical that this is an obligation on the community in each place, the Netziv could argue that it is also logical that the Sanhedrin are best placed to establish and supervise a national system of botei din. For the Netziv, this could allow the linguistic indication of “yourself” to override the opposing logic. Those opposing the view of the Netziv could use the logic of an obligation on the community to reinterpret the “yourself” in a less literal fashion, as referring the the individual in the context of a member of the community.

Friday 7 August 2009

Parshas Eikev

It's the Thought That Counts


“And it will be on account of your harkening to these statutes and guarding them and doing them, and Hashem your God will guard the covenant and the kindness which he swore to your fathers. And He will love you and bless you and increase you and bless the fruit of our womb and the fruits of your land, your grain, your corn and your wine, the young of your cattle and the choice of your flocks on the land which was sworn to your fathers to be given to you.” (Devorim 7:12-14)

Rashi: “And it will be on account of your harkening: If the minor mitzvos that a person tramples with his heels you harken to…..”

“And Hashem your God will guard the covenant: He will guard for you His guarantee.”

Why des the verse specify those “minor” mitzvos, especially those which people disregard?
Does the verse refer to “just” these mitzvos or “even” these mitzvos. The Gur Aryeh understands this as meaning “even”, since all mitzvos have details which seem minor.

Rabbi Moshe Feinstein in Drash Moshe writes that a mitzvah only appears more of less significant if one performs mitzvos on the basis of his understanding, one who performs mitzvos because Hashem has commanded it won’t distinguish because every mitzvoh is an equally significant commandment of Hashem.

According to this Rashi’s explanation o the verse is that I we perform the mitzvos because Hashem commanded them and thus serve Hashem, He will uphold His covenant.

The outcome of a half hearted service of Hashem will be that mitzvos will contain an element of “performed according to ones understanding”, that is, to the extent that one doesn’t perform a mitzvo out of devotion to the Creator the motivation will be a composite of ones understanding, habit and social pressure etc. together with some amount of devotion to Hashem.

In parsha Bechukosai the verse says, “If in my edicts you shall walk and my commandments you shall guard and do them; and I shall give you yours rains at their appropriate times and your land shall give its harvest and the tree of the field shall give its fruit” If Yisroel shall observe Hashem’s mitzvos, then they shall receive blessing.

A partial observance of mitzvos, with some details and apparently minor commandments being trampled under heal, indicates that he mitzvos are not being observed out of true service of Hashem. Such mitzvos don’t qualify as mitzvos for covenant purposes.

A similar idea is found in Yevamos 39b; “Aba Shaul says, one who marries his yevomo out of attraction, in order to have a wife or for any other (ulterior) motive, has committed illicit relations and the child born of such a relationship is close in my eyes to being a momzer, (a child born of illicit relations).

Even though the actions of the mitzvo were performed perfectly, a lack of intention for the purpose of mitzvo, even though the brother knows that he is participating in yibum, will cause that action to be considered close to a non-action for mitzvo purposes. (One may only have relations with his brother’s wife, even after his brother’s death in the cas of yibum). Aba Shaul is close to rendering the act as non-yibum and thus forbidden relations resulting in the child being a momzer.

If we apply this idea to all mitzvos, insufficient intention in the performance of the mitzvo as a commandment of Hashem will correspondingly cause that mitzvo to be considered a non-mitzvo for keeping the covenant purposes.

Therefore we can understand Rashi as explaining the verse to say, “If you keep my commandments fully, as an indication of your dedication to Hashem, out of a desire to serve Him, and thus keep your side of the covenant, He will keep His side of the covenant too.”