Thursday 30 April 2009

Acharei/Kedoshim 5769

“And Hashem spoke to Moshe after the death of the two sons of Aharon at their offering/drawing close in front of Hashem and they died.” Shemos 16:1

“And Hashem said to Moshe, speak to Aharon your brother; “And don’t come at all times into the snatuary behind the Paroches to the face of the Kapores (cover) that is on the Aron and (he won’t) die, for in a cloud I shall appear on the Kapores.” Shemos 16:2

If the posuk tells us that Hashem spoke to Moshe after the death of his two sons, why does the same posuk tell us that they died as a result of their offering? We would have expected the verse to miss out the ending of “And they died”.

Therefore it must be that the two expressions of the death of Aharon’s sons must perform different functions in the verse and tell us different things.

The Gemoro in Yoma, (53:a), discusses the opening verses of our parsha, “R’ Elazar says, “he will not die” – (this tells us the) punishment, (for abrogating this commandment), “For in a cloud I shall appear – (this tells us the) prohibition” “One could think that this was said before the death of the sons of Aharon, thus the Torah says, “After the death of the two sons of Aharon”, etc.
“Rava says, “For in a cloud I shall appear”, and He had not yet appeared! What was the reason that they were punished? As we have learnt, R’ Elazar says, the sons of Aharon did not die for any reason other than that they ruled on the din in front of their teacher” (The din being that even though a fire descended from the heavens to consume the offering, a regular fire was still required to be kindled).

The Gemoro in Brochos tells us, “All who rule on a halocho in front of their rebbi/teacher is liable for death”, however this doesn’t normally carry an immediate heavenly death sentence!

In HoEmek Dovor, the Netziv explains that, the first two verses are two separate points. Nadav and Avihu sinned by ruling in front of Moshe, and were killed immediately since Hashem’s aspect of strict justice, (midas hadin), had been aroused by their entrance into the Sanctuary, (the beis in “b’hakravtem” – in their offering/drawing close is not functioning as “when” here but is rather indicating that they were geographically in front of Hashem as it were). As the Ntziv writes, “Their sin was at the moment that they drew close before Hashem in the palace of the King of all Kings, the Holy One Blessed Be He”.

Afterwards Hashem told Moshe this parsha, preceding it with this first verse to teach that any kohen who is not meticulous in performing the Yom Kippur service in the sanctuary in accordance with the halocho – “his blood is on his head”. He’d better watch out because midas hadin is about! In the King’s palace, a higher standard of behavior is expected at all times!

Why does midas hadin make a difference?
The Satmar Rov in Divrei Yoel, (Parshas Pinchas), quotes the Divrei Chaim of Tzanz who explains that there is a disagreement amongst the commentators as to when the Egyptian exile began. There are those who say that it began from the birth of Yitzchok and therefore was finished at the point of the Exodus. There are others who say that it began only from the actual enslavement itself and thus had not finished at the point of the Exodus, thus requiring it to be completed at a later point. When Hashem is acting in accordance with midas harachamim – the attribute of mercy, then He “rules” according to the lenient opinion that the exile ended with the Exodus, however, when Yisroel sin, He rules in accordance with the strict opinions that the exile still requires completion. The woes that befall us as a result are a continuation of the Egyptian exile.
The Satmar Rov uses this principle to go on to explain why a plague broke out amongst the people as a result of Zimri’s taking a Moabite woman and challenging Moshe in front of the whole nation as to whether she was permitted to him.
There are different opinions in the Gemoro as to what extent one is required to chastise their fellow when they sin. The stricter opinion says until they physically assault you, the lenient says until they curse you. The sin of Zimri caused Hashem to act towards us in accordance with midas hadin and thus follow the strict opinion which says that Klal Yisroel should have prevented this sin from taking place even at the threat of physical violence from the tribe of Shimon in defense of their prince. Now since they had not fulfilled their obligation, they were punished with a plague.
In both of these cases midas hadin resulted in the application of a stricter ruling where a leniet ruling would otherwise have been expected.

In the case of Bnei Aharon, their being in the “Kings Palace” put them into a situation of midas hadin – geographically triggered midas hadin as opposed to sin triggered. There is a difference here from the cases in Divrei Yoel; no stricter ruling was applied in the face a more lenient one, however the principle of stringency is relevant here. Presumably one isn’t actually executed for ruling in front of ones rebbe, rather the crime is of sufficient magnitude to be deserving of death. In any case there was no warning, testimony of witnesses or judgment by a Sanhedrin, (all essential for capital cases). Midas hadin meant that a sin that would normally go unpunished by man was punished immediately and spectacularly by Hashem. They were deserving of death but the sentence could not be implemented, Hashem stepped in to carry out the judgment despite these issues, the technical factors preventing execution were bypassed thanks to midas hadin.

We know that tzadikim are punished for seemingly minor indiscretions that a regular person would go unpunished for, their greater holiness could perhaps put them into a “King’s Palace” type situation, as they are close to Hashem at all times. (ie. I am suggesting that these are three manifestations of the same idea).


Practically speaking: when monkey business is going on, or when one is involved in matters concerning holiness, extra care is required due to midas hadin.




(Note: the midos/attributes of Hashem are complicated; this essay is not an explanation of these concepts but a study into their application as seen in the revealed Torah of the commentators).

Thursday 23 April 2009

Parshas Tazria - Metzoro 5769

Parshas Tazria

“And Hashem spoke to Moshe to say; Speak to Bnei Yisroel to say; “A woman when she conceives and gives birth to a male and it will make her impure for seven days like the days of her nidas dosoh she will be impure. And thirty day and three days she shall sit in her bloods of purity, all kodesh she shall not touch and to the Mikdosh she shall not come until the filling of her days of purity”. Shemos 12:

Rashi: like in the days of her nidas dosoh she will be impure, like the order of all impurities which are said regarding nidah, it makes her impure with the impurity of child birth, and even if the womb opens without blood.

Rashi: Dosa, a term of seeping from her body. An alternative meaning, a term of infirmity and illness, that a woman doesn’t see blood without feeling ill and her head and limbs feeling heavy upon her.

When a woman menstruates she becomes ritually impure. The posuk here tells us that this is the case regarding a woman who’s given birth as well, (yoledes).

Is this impurity caused by the blood flow as in nidah? Or is the cause of this impurity the birth itself? The first Rashi quoted above tells us that the birth itself causes the impurity, irrelevant of blood flow.

In the case of regular nidah, the passing of blood from the womb is the cause of the impurity, this is the case whether she sees the blood or whether she feels the blood flow without it exiting her body. (Mareh Kohen – Hilchos Nidah).

In Asvan D’Oraytoh, Rabbi Yosef Engel quotes a Tosfos in Bava Kama, (11a), which explains that the issur of yoledes is issur and not tumah. This means that even though the status of yoledes creates an obligation of purification and makes the woman impure, the prohibition on relations with her is not because she is impure but because the Torah prohibits such relations separate to her status of impurity, were it not for this separate prohibition, relations would be permitted despite the status of impurity.

R’ Y Engel goes on to cite Rambam in Hilchos Isurei Bi’oh, perek 5, halocho 2, that all women become impure through the internal passage of blood, therefore this will apply to a yoledes and a nidah.

Now then: Rashi seems to hold that the impurity of yoledes comes from the birth itself, the Rambam according to R’ Y Engel with the backing of his application of Tosfos to the Rambam says that the impurity comes from the passage of blood. (It could be that without R’ Yosef, Tosfos could agree with Rashi regarding birth and disagree with Rambam that the din is the same whether nidah or yoledes).

The Gur Aryeh and Mizrachi explain Rashi’s explanation of no blood required for the yoledes to become impure; because if there is blood, she will be impure as a nidah, not a yoledes. Therefore if the Torah has a separate parsha for yoledes, it must be that there are different requirements.

Perhaps the Rambam could argue with this and say that a separate parsha is needed for yoledes because the halachos are different. Even though passage of blood is required, the situation of birth converts the status from nidah to yoledes. (The blood is required to get into the parsha of impurity, the status of birth or otherwise will determine whether the impurity caused is nidah or yoledes)




Parshas Metzoro


“And Hashem spoke to Moshe to say: “This will be the law of the metzoro on the day of his purification, and he will be brought to the kohen”. Shemos 14:1-2

“This will be,” “Zos tihiye” is a very unusual way of saying that we are dealing with the law of something, (the Midrash in Toras Kohanim says that this whole sentence is superfluous). If the Torah wanted to introduce the laws of metzoro it could have skipped out “will be/tihiye” completely.

The Midrash in Toras Kohanim makes the drasha, “Tihiye – in this time”, that is, even without a Beis Hamikdosh, a metzoro still performs the purification process but without the offerings.

The phrase “and he will become pure” is used three times in the context of Moetzoro in the parsha:
“And the one being purified will shave all his hair and wash in water and afterwards enter the camp and sit outside his tent for seven days”. 14:8
“And it will be on the seventh day he will shave all of his hair, his head, his beard, and his eyebrows and he will wash his clothes and wash his clothes in water and he will become pure”. 14:9
“And the kohen will offer up the oleh and minchah offerings on the altar and the kohen will atone him and he will become pure”. 14:21

These three repetitions correspond to three levels of impurity/purification:

Before the first shaving the metzoro may not enter the camp. Afterwards he may enter, he will not cause something which he carries or sits on to become impure.
After seven days and the second shaving, he will not longe make someone he touches impure and after immersion and nightfall he can eat ma’aser and trumoh, (tithes – if he’s a kohen or Levy or has ma’aser sheni in Yerushaliyim).
After the korban he may eat from kodshim. (Rambam in Hilchos Metzoro)

In order for the metzoro to become sufficiently pure to eat kodshim – sacrifices, the respective sacrifice is required. In our times, where (due to our sins) there is no Temple and thus no sacrifices, there is no necessity to attain this level of purity. Therefore, the metzoro can perform the other stages of purification to remove themselves from the most intense levels of impurity.

Now that we have seen this, why do we need a Midrash to tell us that from the word “tihiye” in the verse the process of purification of a metzoro up until the bringing of the korban can be performed even without a Beis HaMikdosh? If everything else can still be performed, why should our inability to offer the relevant sacrifice to attain a level of purity that doesn’t have any practical consequences prevent the rest?

Perhaps the presentation of the three stages would lead us to think that this is one long process, if one part is unable to be performed, the whole process is nullified. The verses read:
“And the one being purified will shave all his hair and wash in water and afterwards enter the camp and sit outside his tent for seven days”. 14:8
“And it will be on the seventh day he will shave all of his hair, his head, his beard, and his eyebrows and he will wash his clothes and wash his clothes in water and he will become pure”. 14:9
“And on the eighth day he will take two male lambs, unblemished and one female year old ewe, unblemished……….etc.”

The sacrifice is brought on the eighth day, if the posuk had read, “after the seventh day” or something similar, then it would be clear that the last stage could be separated from the previous two and that even without the offerings, the first two stages of purity could be attained in accordance with the ruling of the Rambam above. However, written as it is, it appears to me that the simple understanding, (especially after the Rashi dealing with the opening posuk of Shmini – see last week’s post), is that the Torah presents us with a non-divisible eight day process. Therefore, an extra word of “tihye/will be” is necessary to tell us that even when it is impossible to bring the offerings, the rest of the process can be split off, to attain the lower levels of purity.

(It could be that the Torah presents the purification of the metzoro as one process to tell us that a stage can’t be skipped over).


Have a nice Shabbos – no loshon horo!

Thursday 16 April 2009

Parshas Shmini 5769

All 7's and 8's

And it was on the eighth day, (of the inauguration of the Miskon), Moshe called to Aharon and to his children and to the Elders of Ysrael,. And he said to them, “Take a one year old bull as a chatas and an unblemished goat for an Olah and offer them in front of Hashem.” Shemos 9:1-2

Rashi, “And it was on the eighth day, the eighth day of inauguration, this was Rosh Chodesh Nissan, when the Mishkon was erected on that day and ten crowns were taken as is recorded in Seder Olam.

At first glance, we may not have known that this posuk is referring to the eighth day of the inauguration of the Miskon, therefore Rashi tells us that this is the case. However, the previous Parsha ends, detailing the procedures of the inauguration of the Miskon, if there has been no indication of a change in subject why would we think that the verse is discussing anything else?

The Gur Aryeh points out that at the end of Parshas Tzav, the Torah writes, “And from the entrance of the Tent of Meeting they shall not go out for seven days until the days of their inauguration have been fulfilled, all seven days they shall bring their offerings,” (according to Onkelus) (Shemos 8:13). This sounds like the inauguration of the Mishkon was a seven day process.
Therefore, even though the posuk of “And it was on the eighth day”, follows on from a parsha dealing with the inauguration of the Mishkon, this earlier posuk would appear to break the continuity of the parshios, (by excluding the possibility of an eighth day), thus meaning that the opening verse of our parsha could be referring to the eight day of the month.
However, we don’t expect the Torah to jump around, we perhaps could see 8:13 as an indication of a break in continuity, but according to the Gur Aryeh, having come from a parsha dealing with the seven days and opening a new parsha dealing with the eighth day, we have to say that here the Torah is referring to the eighth day of the inauguration.
The Gur Aryeh explains that the Torah uses the term “Eighth day”, rather than saying “after the seven days…” to show that this day is connected to the seven days and the focus of the seven days, the whole inauguration process was leading up to this day.
It could be that he means that since the earlier posuk has stated that there were seven days of inauguration and now we are forced into saying that we are dealing with day eight as a continuation of the seven, we have to understand the function of the apparent exclusion of an eighth day in 8:13. Thus we can say that it tells us that there were seven days of the inauguration leading up to the focus of the whole process which was the eighth day; a part of the whole process but different in nature, the preceding days being a preparation for this day.


To summarize, an apparent exclusion in a posuk can be overridden by logic, requiring a reinterpretation of this exclusion whilst keeping it as close as possible to it’s original function.